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Commentary
A Failure of Imagination 
(Intelligence, WMDs, and “Virtual Jihad”) 
SCOTT ATRAN 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 
Paris, France 
and
The University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA 
Intelligence estimates based on models keyed to frequency and recency of past oc- 
currences make people less secure even if they predict most harmful events. The 
U.S. presidential commission on WMDs, the 9/11 commission, and Spain’s comisión 
11-M have condemned the status quo mentality of the intelligence community, which 
they see as being preoccupied with today’s “current operations” and tactical re- 
quirements, and inattentive to tomorrow’s far-ranging problems and strategic solu- 
tions. But the overriding emphasis in these commissions’ recommendations is on 
further vertically integrating intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Such 
proposals to further centralize intelligence and unify command and control are not 
promising given recent transformations in Jihadist networks to a somewhat “leader- 
less resistance” in the wake of Al Qaeda’s operational demise. To defeat terrorist 
networks requires grasping novel relations between an englobing messianic moral 
 framework, the rootless intellectual and physical mobility of immigrant and dias- 
pora communities, and the overarching conceptual, emotional, and logistical afford- 
ances of the Internet. Britain’s WWII experience provides salutary lessons for think- 
ing creatively with decentralized expertise and partially autonomous approaches. 
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 “The temptation to tell a Chief in a great position the things he most likes 
to hear is the commonenst explanation of mistaken policy.” 
—Winston Churchill 
“Do not think what you want to think until you know what you ought to know.” 
—“Crow’s Law,” R.V. Jones, Head of Scientific Intelligence, 
British Air Staff, 1939–45 
Overview 
According to the presidential commission on intelligence regarding weapons of mass 
destruction, U.S. intelligence agencies were “dead wrong” in nearly every prewar assessment 
of Iraq’s WMDs.1 “The bottom line,” the panel co-chairman told reporters, “is 
the intelligence community operated on presumptions or assumptions based on what 
they had seen in 1991. What little evidence they did have, which was inconsistent, was 
tortured into those presumptions.”2 But political chicanery is not required for such a 
huge intelligence failure. 
The historical reporting by the presidential commission is often admirable, as with 
the 9/11 commission before it.3 Most lucid is the call to focus diverse expertise on longrange 
problems that now may be only dimly perceived. But recommendations fall short 
on helping to parry the future sources of attack that carry the most risk, and how best to 
respond. The presidential commission offered over 70 proposals to bolster the powers of 
the new Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment was the core recommendation 
of the 9/11 commission. These powers greatly favor vertical integration of intelligence 
collection, analysis, and operations. Such proposals to centralize intelligence and 
unify command and control are not promising given recent transformations in Jihadist 
networks in the wake of Al Qaeda’s operational demise. 
Hindsight criticism from all sides of the political divide, concerning lack of preparedness 
and astuteness on the part of government agents and officials in regard to 
Iraqi and Al Qaeda designs, often suffers from the illusion that the gathering storm was 
foreseeable, as in a video run backward. More serious is a general lack of awareness on 
the part of intelligence agencies and their critics that intelligence estimates based on 
models keyed to frequency and recency of past occurrences make the United States less 
secure even if they predict most harmful events. The more one looks to the ripples, the 
less one is prepared for a tsunami. 
Terrorist attacks over the last few decades,4 like wars over the last few centuries,5
follow a non-obvious trend in which a very few events are responsible for the vast 
majority of casualties and most of the wrenching changes in world history. Distributions of 
low-probability, catastrophic events are inherently unpredictable but not inconceivable. 
An overriding reason for these avalanching effects is lack of preparation owing to a 
failure of imagination, in addition to over-reliance on what is most usual, obvious, and 
immediately relevant. This trend anticipates future terrorist events with ever broader 
effects, and retaliatory wars that may come to harm hundreds of millions of people 
(with destructive looping effects sweeping the entire world). So, regardless of attitudes 
towards the United States, preventing an attack in America demands the world’s close 
attention.
“Scientific intelligence,” which originated in wartime Britain, provides salutary lessons 
for thinking “outside the box” with decentralized, partially autonomous expertise to 
imagine and reduce the risks and consequences from innovative weapons and methods 
Commentary: A Failure of Imagination   265
S. Atran 
of attack—a tact that Al Qaeda’s acolytes have used implicitly to great effect. Londoners’s 
responses to the German Blitz, like New Yorkers’ responses to Al Qaeda’s bombing of 
the World Trade Center, also suggest that locally varied and distributed response outperforms 
unified command and control. 
Conjectures and Refutations 
Perhaps the most damning aspect of the presidential commission’s report, at least on the 
issue of biological weapons, was “the Intelligence Community’s heavy reliance on a 
human source—codenamed ‘Curveball’—whose information later proved to be unreliable.”6
German intelligence first interviewed Curveball, an Iraqi chemical engineer 
living in Germany, and informed the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 
The DIA passed along the information to the CIA. When the CIA sought to interview 
Curveball, German intelligence told the CIA it was a waste of time because Curveball 
was “a fabricator and crazy.”7 Tyler Drumheller, former head of the CIA European 
Division, recently told reporters that in 2002 he saw “dozens and dozens of e-mails and 
memos” impugning Curveball’s credibility. Nevertheless, former CIA director George 
Tenet claimed that there was never a “formal memo” questioning Curveball’s reliability 
until after then-Secretary of State Colin Powell proffered Curveball’s fantasies as “facts 
and conclusions based on solid intelligence” in a speech to the UN on 5 February 2003.8
Forgotten or ignored in the fiasco were at least three hard lessons, which Reginald 
V. Jones, Britain’s Head of Scientific Intelligence in WWII, summarized years ago:9
(1) It is necessary to avoid “the steady and immediate broadcasting of each . . . uncollated 
fact,” and to withhold such information from political decision makers until checked 
because “to spread half-truth is often to precipitate erroneous action.” (2) The intelligence 
community must provide an “independent voice” that takes no consideration of 
what political decision makers may want to hear because this, as Winston Churchill 
concurred, is “vital” to “the leader on whose decisions fateful events depend.” (3) Information 
from disaffected nationals is usually the most unreliable source on weapons or 
methods available to actual or potential enemies and “must always be checked.” As 
Machiavelli noted long ago: 
How dangerous it is to trust the representatives of exiles . . . such is their 
extreme desire to return to their homes that they naturally believe many 
things that are not true, and add many others on purpose . . . . A prince 
therefore should be slow in undertaking any enterprise upon the representa- 
tions of exiles, for he will generally gain nothing by it but shame and serious 
injury.”10
The presidential commission cites over-reliance on conjecture and lack of concrete evidence 
as critical to the intelligence failure over Iraq’s WMDs. But General Isaac Ben 
Israel, one of Israel’s top military strategists, explained to the author why he sees matters 
differently.11 It is not too much conjecture, but too little that’s at fault. All intelligence 
reports—including those of U.S. allies—noted past attempts by Iraq to build and 
hide chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials. But no one 
really bothered to ask if Iraq had the operational capability to still use them, and if there 
is no such capacity, then either there are no weapons and materials or they are useless. 
Observes Ben Israel: “Surely one shouldn’t expect to dig hidden missiles or production 
facilities out of the sand or some other hiding place, twelve years after they had been 
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buried there, and launch them without all sorts of training and equipment. There was not 
even one report on these subjects. And that’s why I concluded that Iraq posed no real 
threat, at least with WMDs.” 
As in science or business, only bold attempts at both conjecture and refutation can 
significantly reduce uncertainty. For Ben Israel, that is one key lesson of the R.V. Jones 
brand of “scientific intelligence.” Without concerted effort to hypothesize novel scenarios,
and equal effort to reject such creative hypotheses, no true advance in knowledge is 
possible.12 This is not to deny that history and its mistakes can teach many valuable things 
in preparation for the future. For without knowledge of history, one is altogether blind. 
The failure of Israeli Military Intelligence in the October 1973 “Yom-Kippur” War 
is a good illustration of how historical examples can cut both ways. On the one hand, 
pre-occupation with the recent and familiar can lead to erroneous conclusions—philosopher 
Karl Popper has deemed this “the fallacy of induction”—but more significantly it 
can lead to operational or policy disasters.13 For example, preparations for a surprise 
attack by Egypt and Syria took place under cover of a series of military exercises called 
“Tahrir 41.” After careful scrutiny of the previous 40 exercises, Israeli Intelligence learned 
the Tahrir pattern all too well. “When the 41st began, we immediately recognized the 
pattern and assessed it to be another exercise in the series,” says Ben Israel, “only this 
time the Egyptians deviated from the pattern and crossed the canal.” On the other hand, 
this acknowledgment is itself an enlightening use of historical example to gain insight. 
But this kind of example should not be taken as an indication or suggestion of a historical 
pattern that can be projected into the future. 
The coaches and players of successful sports teams seem to intuitively understand 
the point. Once a rival team runs a trick play, shame on you if they do it to you again. 
So, teams prepare for trick plays. But how does a team prepare for a new trick play? 
What local information can lead to a global (or team) response that something strange is 
afoot? Certainly not just by re-reading the play book. True, the past is the only guide to 
the future, but fixing on what is most frequent and near in time can miss the blindside. 
Intelligence estimates that continue to be based primarily on models keyed to frequency 
and recency of past occurrences, make one less secure even if they predict most terrorist 
events.14 The more one fixes on box-cutters and airport security, the more vulnerable the 
U.S. may become. There is little indication from either the intelligence community or its 
critics that this enduring vulnerability is being lessened. 
Facing Catastrophe 
It is not frequent or familiar events, but large and rare ones that are responsible for most 
of the cataclysmic and cascading consequences that shape history, be they climatic and 
biological disasters, major financial and health crises, political and cultural revolutions, 
increasingly destructive wars, or terrorism. Mathematicians call this trend of events a 
“power law distribution” and natural scientists call the resulting shake-up in the structure 
of the world a “phase shift.” Applied to terrorism, this anticipates future terrorist 
events with ever broader political, economic and social effects, and points toward ever 
more massive attack. If the power–law distribution and phase shifts that seem to characterize 
war also kick in, then the world might expect hundreds of millions of casualties if 
a nuclear device were exploded on U.S. soil. (Unless there was specific information to 
the contrary, U.S. intelligence might simply assume that a small-scale nuclear attack 
was carried out by Jihadists and the U.S. military would likely retaliate disproportionately 
and massively against any group, government, or society that tolerated a Jihadist 
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presence).15 Whatever one’s sentiment toward the United States, then, preventing a catastrophic 
terrorist attack on American soil merits the entire world’s immediate and sustained 
concern even if the likelihood of such an attack appears low. 
Physicist Richard Garwin, a former U.S. presidential adviser and recipient of the 
National Medal of Science, sees suicide terrorists more likely to explode a small nuclear 
device at ground level, rather than in the air by missile or plane, because it is easier to 
deliver. “If such a device were delivered by truck or train and detonated in a densely 
populated area,” Garwin told me, “more people would be killed by radiation than in the 
Hiroshima air burst.”16 Garwin is concerned that not enough is being done to prevent 
theft of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).17 He notes that United States and Soviet Union 
made an agreement some years back that the United States would provide 20 billion 
dollars to take 500 tons of HEU—enough for some 8 to 20 thousand nuclear bombs— 
and reduce them from about 94 percent weapons uranium to about 4 percent nuclear 
grade that can be used in nuclear reactors. This process is now a little more than half 
way through. But there are still hundreds more tons of uranium in the former Soviet 
Union that have not been reprocessed. The additional cost of early reprocessing that, not 
down to 4 percent but just down to 19 percent, would be in the tens of millions rather 
than billions of dollars. Garwin believes that the risk of a nuclear attack substantially  
greater than during most years of the Cold War.18
General Anatoly Kulikov, Vice-Chairman of the Russian Duma’s Security Committee, 
downplays the risk of waiting. At a NATO workshop on suicide terrorism that the 
author co-chaired with Ariel Merari last summer, Kulikov declared: “we are absolutely 
certain that current safeguards make theft of HEU practically impossible in our country.” 
Senior Pakistani military officials tell a similar story about the lack of risk that 
rogue elements in their country will disseminate nuclear materials (A.Q. Khan’s clandestine 
nuclear operations notwithstanding). Outside experts are not so sure. 
Pakistani physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, who presently devotes much of his life to easing 
tensions between Pakistan and India,19 and who was one of the first to publicly warn 
against the rogue nuclear operations of fellow countryman Abdul Qader Khan, does not 
fear so much that terrorists could manufacture a plutonium device like North Korea now 
says it has (which can only be used in an implosion mode that is hard for non-state 
actors to engineer because it requires highly sophisticated technology to achieve exact 
spherical symmetry and extremely precise timing) or even steal a HEU device (because 
of sophisticated locks that render the weapon useless if tampered with). But he is concerned 
that HEU can be mined from existing stockpiles for use in a gun-type weapon. It 
would probably have to be built on location from smuggled parts because fabrication 
would require a bit of room, at least an apartment.20
A main worry is that well-educated and motivated Jihadist sympathizers—like the 
anarchist student bombmakers a century ago—know as much about what is needed as 
those trying to stop them.21 “Any graduate student of mine who couldn’t design a workable 
nuclear bomb,” Hoodbhoy said without boast, “doesn’t deserve a Ph.D.” (The basic 
principles for an A-bomb design, though not for an H-bomb, can be had from the declassified 
Serber lectures).22
How can those who yearn for apocalyptic terror be stopped? One cannot be certain 
to ever completely prevent an attack or eliminate its effects, but the risk of attack can 
be greatly reduced and, if an attack comes the damage and suffering can be strongly 
contained. Yet, proposals by the U.S. presidential commission, like the 9/11 commission 
before it, to further centralize intelligence and unify response command and control are 
not promising. 
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The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security annually spend hundreds of 
billions of dollars,23 and mobilize hundreds of thousands of people, trying to disrupt and 
interdict terrorist operations, but furnish orders of magnitude less money and manpower 
to understanding where Jihadist-inspired terrorism comes from, what it is about, and 
where it is going. But to defeat terrorist networks one must understand them. This requires 
grasping the novel relations between an englobing messianic moral framework, 
the rootless intellectual and physical mobility of immigrant and diaspora communities, 
and the overarching conceptual, emotional, and logistical affordances of the Internet. 
Let’s briefly consider, then, each of these dynamic aspects of Global Network Jihad and 
some of their interrelations. 
“Born-Again” Islam: Intermittently Apocalyptic, Not Nihilistic 
Jihadism is a thoroughly modern movement, despite atavistic cultural elements, filling a 
significant portion of the popular political void in Islamic societies left in the wake of 
locally discredited Western ideologies (anarchism, colonialism, fascism, nationalism,  
socialism, communism). Appeals to Muslim history and calls for a revival of the Caliphate 
are important and deeply heartfelt, yet to a considerable extent Jihadism is also  
a countermovement to the ideological thrust ensconced in the National Security Strategy
of the United States,24 which sees liberal democracy as the “single sustainable model of 
national development . . . right and true for every person, in every society and the duty of 
protecting these values against their enemies [a]s the common calling of freedom-loving 
people across the globe and across the ages.”25
Whether right or not, most people in the world pay less attention to U.S. intentions
to democratize others than to the U.S. military expansion and its palpable consequences,
including tens of thousands of Iraqi civilian dead,26 with mistrust of the United States 
ever higher across the world.27 According to the Pentagon’s “Base Structure Report” for 
2004, the U.S. military currently operates more than 900 installations in 46 countries, in 
addition to over 4,600 bases in the U.S. homeland and territories.28 The United States 
State Department presently claims, that “over 100 nations benefit from U.S. military 
training, education,” with funding doubled over the last four years.29 Yet nearly a decade 
ago, a Defense Department Science Board report found that: “Historical data show a 
strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase 
in terrorist attacks against the United States.”30 Global Jihad grows in tandem.”31
As with most historical counter-movements, this countermovement incorporates  
some of the main social and spiritual missions of its adversary. Indeed, perhaps more may  
be learned about Jihadism’s apocalyptic yearnings and its “Born Again” vision of personal 
salvation through radical action from the New Testament’s Book of Revelation than
from the Quran.32 Nor does Islam per se or “Muslim civilization” really have anything 
to do with terrorism—no more than some impossibly timeless or context-free notion of 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism can be held responsible for the dead millions 
of which these religious traditions have been accused.33
One of the most important post 9/11 developments in Global Network Jihad is that 
surviving Al Qaeda offshoots and newly emerging Jihadist groups and cells no longer 
consider themselves to be territorially rooted in supporting populations. For example, 
although Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya, EIJ) and Egyptian Islamic Group 
(Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, EIG) have common roots in Egyptian society, one crucial 
difference between them is that the EIJ leadership under Dr. Ayman Zawahiri left Egypt 
to join bin Laden in Afghanistan whereas EIG remained behind in Upper Egypt (Said).34
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The hostile reaction of Saidis to the 1997 EIG massacre of 58 tourists at the Temple 
Of Queen Hatshepsut in Luxor, and to interference by outside jihadis and loss of 
trade, effectively ended EIG’s ability to mount military operations. By contrast, 
al-Zawahiri continues to urge Jihadists everywhere to inflict the greatest possible 
damage and cause the maximum casualties on the West, no matter how much time and 
effort these operations take, and regardless of the immediate consequences. 
Unconstrained by concrete concerns for what will happen to any population that 
supports them, they can allow themselves to seriously imagine fulfillment of their apocalyptic 
vision. Still, it is nonsense to claim—as most leading U.S. politicians and pundits do— 
that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers have no morality and simply want to annihilate 
Western civilization. In general, charges of “nihilism” against an adversary usually reflect 
the willful ignorance of those leveling the charge regarding their adversary’s moral 
framework. According to Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA team tracking Al 
Qaeda, bin Laden has never preached destruction of Western culture and, at every turn, 
has sincerely sought moral justification for Al Qaeda’s actions and demands.35 This 
includes bin Laden’s invocation of a fatwah published in May 2003 by radical Saudi 
cleric Hamid bin al-Fahd permitting the use of nuclear weapons to inflict millions of 
casualties on the United States36—unless the United States changes its foreign policy in 
the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world.37
Current risk management approaches to countering terrorism often assume adversaries 
model the world on the basis of rational choices that are commensurable across 
cultures. But for the would-be martyrs the author has interviewed it often does not matter 
that others will reap the rewards of his sacrifice. Neither does it seem to matter for those 
who issue religious edicts (fatwahs) condoning Jihadist martyrdom if the martyr (shaheed) 
kills thousands of foes or no one but himself—he will attain Paradise just the same. When 
the author asked questions of the sort: “So what if your family were to be killed in 
retaliation for your action?” or “What if your father were dying and your mother found 
out your plans for a martyrdom attack and asked you to delay until the family could get 
back on its feet?” To a person the would-be suicide bombers the author interviews answer 
along the lines that there is duty to family and duty to God but duty to God cannot be 
postponed. Such answers, if sincere (and there is little doubt they are), suggest that devotional 
values are not very sensitive to standard calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity, 
or to tradeoffs across different moral and cultural frameworks.38 This means that traditional 
calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy (for example by eliminating most 
key operatives or threatening destruction of supporting populations) may not succeed.39
The Jihadist Diaspora: Rootless and Dynamic 
Many of the most effective and enduring terrorist movements of modern times originated 
with, and have been sustained by, diaspora communities, often led by student immigrants 
who later import radical ideology and terrorist methods into the national movements of 
their home territories. Examples include the anarchist “Black Hand,” the Boston-bred IRA, 
the “exile leadership” of the PLO, and the British Commonwealth’s Tamil Tiger support 
groups. Similarly, for Al Qaeda and the global Jihadist network that claims inspiration 
from it, over 80 percent of known activists live in diaspora communities.40
Arguably the greatest potential terrorist threat in the world today lies with uprooted 
and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower 
for both the 9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks. Immigrant integration into European 
societies has always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven 
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and “top down” than community-based and “bottom up.” In the United States, for example, 
if an immigrant group pays local property taxes, then the schools that run on 
those taxes tend to be more sensitive to cultural diversity. Integration into American 
society is one important reason that Jihadist groups have not viably taken root in the 
United States. By contrast, Jules Ferry, the French prime minister who instituted modern 
secular education in Europe, once bragged that he knew what every public school teacher 
in every town in France would be teaching at a given time. Observes French political 
scientist Olivier Roy, in Europe “multiculturalism” is taken not as valuing diversity but 
as a sign of withdrawal—an attempt to create alien entities between the individual and 
state.41 That is why almost the entire political spectrum of France opposed attempts by 
Muslim girls to wear headscarves in public schools. There is no indication that any rival 
to Jihadism’s uncompromising vision of a fair and just society—which debriefings show 
clearly motivate these people—is being conveyed to would-be Jihadist youth in Europe. 
Secular education and open elections do not by themselves speak sufficiently to the 
spiritual and cultural needs that their rootlessness generates. 
The European Union’s increasingly open society is currently more favorable to farflung 
networking among Jihadists than to an efficient coordination among different government 
services that remain hidebound to national territories and politics, and to professional 
hierarchies and traditional languages. The steep decline in birth rate among 
native Europeans, which is highest in southern European countries most accessible to 
immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, and rising need for immigrant 
labor will only exacerbate the problem. Neither Europe nor the United States can deal 
with this alone. 
“The Virtual Hand” of Global Jihad 
Despite claims to the contrary, there is no longer the controlling agency of the Al Qaeda 
leadership to target, which seems to be operationally near dead: remnants of the—mostly 
Egyptian—hardcore around bin Laden have not managed an attack in over three years, 
do not know who many of the new terrorists are, and cannot communicate secretly with 
those they do know.42 Instead, groups of friends and family originating from the same 
area “back home” in North Africa or the Middle East, or from similar European housing 
projects and marginal neighborhoods, bond into action as they surf Jihadist websites on 
the internet to find direction from Al Qaeda’s inspiration. 
Analyzing case studies of nearly 500 globally networked Jihadists, University of 
Pennsylvania forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman, a former intelligence officer who ran 
operations during the Afghan–Soviet War, finds that the social networks of these hard- 
to-penetrate militant groups are composed of about 20 percent kin and 70 percent friends 
(who tend to become kin over time through intermarriage).43 Most operational cells of 
Jihadists have only a few members—cells of eight members seem to be the mode. Although 
the members of each cell usually show remarkable in-group homogeneity (age, place  
of origin, residence, educational background, socioeconomic status, food likings, and so on)  
there is little homogeneity across the Jihadist diaspora (which renders attempts at profiling  
global Jihadists worthless). The cells are often spontaneously formed and self-mobilizing,  
with few direct physical contacts to other cells. But radicalization usually requires outside 
input from, and interaction with, the larger Jihadist community. Radicalization is  
proceeding apace with exponential growth in internet connections (in the last five  
years the number of Jihadist websites has increased from under 20 to over 3,000). 
Although as yet scarcely researched, personal bonds formed without physical contact. 
Commentary: A Failure of Imagination   271
S. Atran 
on the Internet appear to generate solid reputations for trustworthiness44 and all the deep 
commitment and even love that physical intimacy does, but often faster and over a 
wider set of personal relations. A recent study by psychologists at the University of 
Bath of online dating site members has found that when couples who had built up a 
significant relationship by e-mailing or chatting online met for the first time, 94 percent 
went on to see each other again. Moreover, “We found that men tend to be more committed 
to the online relationships than women, possibly because the anonymity of writing 
gives them a chance to express their emotions more readily than in real life.”45
Nevertheless, the internet also provides special affordances for women, especially in 
Muslim society where they could not otherwise participate directly in Jihadist meetings 
with men. (Two suicide attacks in spring 2005 in Egypt wove together these strands of 
friendship, kinship and women meeting on Internet.) 
The semi-anonymity of Internet communication, which lessens the compulsion to 
hedge and defend oneself, promotes self-disclosure and facilitates disregard of contextual 
differences that might otherwise distract from or hinder communication (distinct 
physiques and surroundings, unfamiliar expressions and gestures, strange smells or sounds, 
clothes, cars or smoking preferences, and so on). Especially with groups of individuals 
who are stigmatized in physically non-obvious ways (say, gays as opposed to the physically 
handicapped) such disclosure is often emotionally bare and truthful, which cements 
trust. In addition, the need to make verbally explicit one’s feelings and ideas 
favors disambiguation of messages and reaching mutual understanding and consensus. 
So, a self-organized group of friends, like the would-be Madrid bomber plotters, 
may read an Internet text, like “Iraqi Jihad” that suggests bombing Spanish trains to 
force that country’s withdrawal from the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.46 Chatting with likeminded 
Jihadists on the web, the group of friends radicalizes into a Jihadist cell and—in 
just a few weeks—an “amateur” plot is hatched and devastatingly executed (unlike the 5 
years or so it took Al Qaeda to plan and execute 9/11).47 The fact that all of the plotters 
are caught or blow themselves up may have no effect on the ability of other groups to 
self-organize and be radicalized for attack. 
A new and vibrant Jihadist “market” is emerging, which is decentralized, self-organizing 
and self-adjusting. How do we deal with the “virtual hand” that regulates this 
growing world exchange? Raw police force and military power likely will not do the 
trick but only generate more varied and insidious forms of the Jihadist hydra. It may 
take a broad and elastic web, of the diverse talent and spare conformity of our democracies, 
to snare the virtual hand of Jihad. 
Responses from the intelligence community are also not encouraging. The CIA’s 
new director Porter Goss, in his inaugural appearance before Congress,48 simply reaffirmed 
the misleading impression that some specific group called “Al Qaeda” is out 
there planning bigger and better attacks, with the inference that hammering Al Qaeda 
should remain the principal occupation of America’s “war on terror.” And the best that 
some people who advise the intelligence community seem to come up with for preventing 
another 9/11 or Madrid attack is to better combine “the three methodologies” that are 
almost guaranteed failures for anticipating catastrophic events: pattern projection, frequency, 
and probability.49 Tinkering with broken pots is not the answer. 
Decentralizing Responses to Terrorism: A “Paradigm Change” 
A key factor in the success of any intelligence effort is the realization that strategies to 
defeat an enemy must change with changes in scale. It may take distributed intelligence 
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networks to fight globally connected networks of local terrorist cells. The very framework 
for formulating hypotheses and operationalizing ways to test them may require 
what philosopher Thomas Kuhn has called a “paradigm change” in thinking that fundamentally 
alters the relation between figure and ground.50 Defense against national armies 
and so-called rogue states, where classical measures of deterrence and threats of massive 
retaliation against readily identifiable populations and infrastructure are still likely to 
prove effective, may have to be decoupled from defense against transnational terrorist 
networks, where such measures may be wholly counterproductive. 
Traditionally, hierarchical forms of military and intelligence “command and control” 
were suitable for large-scale operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s global 
organization, but are patently less so now (although classical means are still needed to 
prevent sanctuaries from reemerging). Informal bonds may need to grow among diverse 
experts with idiosyncratic personal skills and the operational branches fighting terrorism, 
so that a phone call from an expert or operator in one country to another country can 
trigger specific responses without plodding through official channels—much the way 
globally networked Jihadists now operate. This would help to convert fairly static modes 
of attack-response into a dynamic and evolving system of “predator–prey” relations between 
intelligence networks and Jihadist networks, and throw open the flow of information 
that would allow the intelligence and military communities’ technological advantages 
to keep ahead of Jihadist innovations in the arms race between the networks. 
Todd Laporte of the University of California at Berkeley finds in a review of U.S. 
nuclear facilities the best way to ward off unexpected catastrophe is to have decentralized 
networks with specialized teams of technically competent people whose culture 
rewards them for revealing their own errors51—a practice Al Qaeda has used to great 
effect. This tact contrasts markedly with recommendations for further directorial control 
of security services. Even now there is no institutional means for intelligence case officers 
who may know better to challenge information once it is passed on by “the 7th 
floor” (the inside name for the political directorship). 
General evolutionary theory teaches that many small and energetic creatures  
or systems—for example, bacteria or decentralized Jihadist networks—are often able  
to overwhelm and out compete larger and more ponderous ones—for example, whole  
bodies or the armies and police forces of nation-states.52 The allied theory of complex 
adaptive systems conveys a parallel lesson: if you want to solve a novel problem in an  
by consulting a decentralized group of problem solvers with diverse skills and expertise 
rather than a hierarchically organized group of like-minded experts who seek consensus, 
even if they are the best in the field.53
R. V. Jones, the father of “scientific intelligence,” implicitly knew much of this. 
With the Battle of Britain in full swing and his country’s back to the wall, this junior 
staffer networked a hodge-podge of thinkers to deal with national survival, from actor 
Leslie Howard (of Gone with the Wind fame) to the Bletchley cryptographers, such as 
the unconventional mathematical wizard and sometimes biological theorist, Alan Turing, 
who founded computer science. They blocked the Luftwaffe to prevent the invasion of 
Britain (by “bending” guidance beacons so that bombs fell off target), and capped the 
missile menace that represented the Nazis’s last hope of survival (by focusing decryption 
efforts not on immediate operations but on V-1 and V-2 trails in Poland). All in all, they 
were enormously successful in breaking Nazi codes, anticipating attacks, and keeping 
one step ahead of a bewildering array of ingenious German weapons systems that were 
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recognized—as early as September 1944—as having the potential to take men to the 
moon and deliver atomic bombs from the stratosphere. 
Another lesson from wartime Britain was that local citizens and responders drawn 
from the population under attack were more efficient than any central planners in caring 
for their people, preventing panic, and helping them get back on their feet. A British 
team of psychologists and defense analysts that recently re-examined the evidence from 
WWII, not only found that panic was a rare phenomenon, even during the most unexpected 
and horrific airplane and missile attacks, but that civilians proved more resilient 
than planners had predicted, largely because the planners had underestimated civilian 
adaptability and resourcefulness.”54 Studies of responses to urban air raids during the 
Spanish Civil War55 and among German civilians who suffered saturation bombing in 
WWII56 show similar results. 
One interpretation of civilian wartime resilience is that the population was being 
habituated to war and so had time to develop coping responses.57 But the utterly surprising 
and unprepared for attacks on the World Trade Center and the Madrid commuter trains 
show civilian reactions to be much the same, despite no time for habituation.58 For the most 
part, local citizens responded immediately and efficiently. A lesson of 9/11 was that locally 
aware actors are best able to respond to unexpected and varied local conditions.59 One irony 
of 9/11 was that the principal facility of the New York Mayor’s Office of Emergency 
Management, located at 7 World Trade Center, was completely destroyed in the attack. 
Volunteers who came primarily from local universities began staffing a geographic information 
systems and mapping unit within New York City’s emergency operations center, 
and a motley collection of local boats spontaneously began to efficiently coordinate supply 
and relief efforts well before official efforts were under way. Not only was there no panic, 
but in the case of the World Trade Center, victims of the attack responded much better than 
any current response model would have predicted. They were “better than rational.” So has 
Al Qaeda been, and so must the intelligence community learn to be. 
Old Wine in New Bottles: A Recipe for Disaster 
The presidential commission on WMDs and the 9/11 commission have condemned the 
status quo mentality of the intelligence community, which they see as being preoccupied 
with today’s “current operations” and tactical requirements, and inattentive to tomorrow’s 
far-ranging problems and strategic solutions. Both commissions call for steps 
to improve analysis and encourage diversity, including routine critiques of finished intelligence 
and alternative assessments by outside experts. But the overriding emphasis 
in both commissions’ reports is on further vertically integrating intelligence collection, 
analysis, and operations. 
“It won’t help matters to have a National Intelligence Director whose job is to 
prepare briefs to bring to the President every day or simply to coordinate intelligence 
products,” former Attorney General Edwin Meese recently commented; “what we could 
use is a facilitator to bring people and ideas together, not another operative. But it’s not 
clear to me that’s what’s being proposed.”60 Indeed, given the novel and peculiar nature 
of the threat, what has been proposed and is currently being implemented—ever more 
hierarchical command and control—may be precisely the wrong way to go. People don’t 
repeat history’s catastrophes just because they forget; people build self-destructive ideologies 
and behaviors that continue history’s catastrophic path because they may remember 
the past too well. 
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